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Abstract
This article presents an analysis of the characteristics that are associated with union membership 
duration using data from the membership registers of the largest Spanish trade union: Comisiones 
Obreras (CCOO, Workers’ Commissions). Making use of survival analysis techniques, the results 
indicate that the shortest membership durations and the highest risks of leaving are associated 
with workers with poor employment conditions, mainly youth and foreigners, as well as those in 
firms, economic sectors, and territories where the union has a rather weak presence. As workers 
in these situations represent the majority of both current joining and leaving rates, the article 
concludes that retention policies should focus on the early stages of union membership.
Keywords
Dual labor market, trade unions, union membership
Introduction
In the last two decades, a number of countries have exhibited high in- and out-flows of 
union membership (Frege and Kelly, 2004; Labbe and Croiset, 1992; Martinez Lucio, 
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1998; Miguélez, 2000). Spain is a prime example of this phenomenon, where levels of 
annual membership in-flows and out-flows above 10% of overall membership have been 
documented, indicating particularly dynamic union membership1 (Alós et al., 2011). 
Although enlightening, the aggregated data do not indicate whether there is only a pro-
gressive renewal of the membership or an increasing pluralization of union membership 
trajectories as well. For the latter, we would expect asymmetries in membership trajecto-
ries. Put simply, some workers would experience stable and linear trajectories, while 
others would experience short memberships or constant disruptions and re-entrance into 
membership. To explain these asymmetries from a micro-level perspective, studies on 
union memberships have distinguished a wide range of characteristics and reasons 
behind entering (Guest and Conway, 2004; Lange et al., 1982; Visser, 2002; Waddington 
and Whitston, 1997) and leaving the union (Guest and Conway, 2004; Klandermans, 
1997; Lévesque et al., 2005; Waddington, 2006). However, these analyses are largely 
static; identifying membership status and determinant characteristics for a discrete inter-
val of time.
In this article, we present a more dynamic approach and analyze membership trajec-
tories to understand membership dynamics and complement existing knowledge on 
membership turnover to inform membership retention policies. As an initial step we look 
at the length or duration of memberships (i.e., the link between the joining and leaving 
events along a time axis). The underlying premise is that although all union members 
will end up leaving the union, some members will exit sooner than others. The latter 
aspect is what we want to test and we expect our results on duration of membership to be 
in line with previous findings indicating a divide between membership groups experienc-
ing both higher entrance and leaving rates (e.g., youth, women, and foreigners) and those 
with more stable memberships (Alós et al., 2011).
A comprehensive examination of the length of membership requires the application of 
longitudinal methods for the analysis of durations (i.e., survival analysis) (Blossfeld 
et al., 2007). This goes beyond the traditional analysis of membership tenure (i.e., length 
of stay of current membership), as the outcome of analysis is the proportion of members 
who remain in the union over membership time, including actual members as well as 
those who left the union by the end of the observation period. The empirical results allow 
responses to the following questions:
1. How many union members remain after a given interval of membership duration 
since joining?
2. What are the intervals of membership duration with the highest risks of union 
attrition?
3. Which personal-, labor-, and union-related characteristics are associated with 
shorter or longer membership durations?
Analyses of membership duration for the Spanish case are somewhat of a novelty. We 
use archival data of membership registries of one of the largest Spanish union federa-
tions: Comisiones Obreras (CCOO). Membership turnover and duration are relevant 
objects of analysis for this case study owing to indirect linkages between job change – 
and/or termination – and membership withdrawal in CCOO. Membership is voluntary 
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and conditioned solely on payment of union dues. Workers in unionized environments 
can join or exit the union at any time. Those changing firms, or sectors of activity, may 
retain their membership at their discretion. A centralized membership registry allows 
tracking employment changes without membership status change. Interestingly, CCOO 
membership is not restricted to salaried workers. Although a minority, the CCOO data 
include unemployed and retired persons in the membership counts; additionally, non-
employed members pay reduced dues.
We focus on a sample of members who joined the union after January 2005, while 
leaving is restricted to an observation window for which we have individual-level data 
on union withdrawal (between January and October 2009). The greatest advantage of 
using the registries is the ability to account for the whole population of membership exits 
for the period (160,000 exits). To obtain unbiased results of the duration analyses, we 
compare the durations of exits with those who remained members by the end of the 
observation window of our study (October 2009), which account for more than 1 million 
observations. The results of our analyses indicate that shorter membership duration is 
associated with workers in peripheral positions in the labor market. This is mostly youth, 
foreigners, and workers based in firms, economic sectors, and territories where eco-
nomic activity is associated with seasonality, insecure employment, and where union 
presence is rather low.
Spanish industrial relations, CCOO, and the evolution 
of union membership composition
In this article we analyze the membership of one of the two main unions in Spain, 
Comisiones Obreras. CCOO is a union federation, encompassing salaried workers from 
all occupational and economic activity sectors, with a functional structure of activity 
branches within territorial organizations. The origins of the union are based on industrial 
tradition. However, as with its European counterparts, union membership in CCOO has 
evolved to mirror the occupational structure of the Spanish labor market. Workers in 
service activities are currently the majority, with a strong incidence of public sector 
workers. Moreover, in the last decade, the presence of women and immigrants has 
increased. These groups – together with younger workers, workers with unstable job 
contracts, and those in companies without union presence – remain underrepresented.
The evolution of the current membership composition reflects internal and external 
changes since the legalization of unions in Spain (1977). With a union density of 18% at 
the time of legalization, membership in Spanish unions initially declined (1977–1980) 
and fluctuated during the 1980s due to the economic cycle and the early stage of institu-
tional consolidation, or the transition from informal movements towards formal organi-
zations (Jordana, 1996). A union strategy oriented towards legal recognition reduced 
resources which could have otherwise been utilized for membership attraction and reten-
tion. This lack of interest may have also derived from the fact that the relative importance 
of unions in Spain is not measured by the membership size, but by the results of union 
representatives’ elections at the firm level.2 Together with Unión General de Trabajadores 
(UGT), the second largest union federation with a similar structure and composition, 
CCOO controls approximately three-quarters of union representation in Spain (38.8% 
 at Universidad de Valencia on July 2, 2015eid.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
510 Economic and Industrial Democracy 35(3)
CCOO, 37.1% UGT) (Beneyto, 2011). In addition, some features of the legal framework, 
the Workers’ Statute of 1980, have determined the persistently low union density 
(Fernández Macias, 2003; Hamann, 2001). These are the workers’ delegation of bargain-
ing rights in a dual representation system that allows both membership (Sección Sindical) 
and non-membership (Delegado – Comité de Empresa ) firm-based workers’ representa-
tion, and the erga omnes institution that enhances free-rider mentalities; that is, the 
extension of union bargaining outcomes in the functional and territorial setting where 
bargaining takes place independently of whether workers are members or not (Miguélez 
et al., 1991).3 To illustrate this fact, although the union density of both CCOO and UGT 
is only around 20%, their bargaining outcomes, mostly at sectoral levels of negotiation, 
affect between 80 and 85% of the total salaried workforce.4 As a result, Köhler and 
Martin (2005) indicate that incentives to join and remain in the union, at this stage, were 
based on union identity – principally male workers in large industrial companies and 
unionized environments.
In the mid-1980s, the break with prior political affiliation (leading to the start of the 
long-term collaboration between the two union federations), a progressive formalization 
of the organizational structures, and a favorable economic and political context led to 
rising membership levels for both federations. In addition, these same circumstances led 
to their legitimization as social partners, culminating in the general strike of 1988 (Alós 
et al., 2011; Hamman, 2001; Hamman and Martinez Lucio, 2003). The steady increase 
of membership in CCOO since has been linked to a turn from a reactive to a proactive 
attitude. This has induced new strategies on the quantity and quality of employment.
Adapting to the increasingly segmented labor market (Toharia, 2011), specifically 
labor reforms that introduced fixed-term contracts and the dramatic increase of women 
and foreigners in the labor market, the union launched recruitment programs targeting 
these groups.5 New membership groups feature vulnerable job situations in comparison 
to traditional membership due to insufficient employment protection and the persistently 
high costs of collective action derived from lack of union presence at the workplace. The 
gradual growth of non-traditional membership has been encouraged by the introduction 
of elements of a social partnership model and the extension of services (e.g., training and 
legal representation). This has coincided with a slight retention of members experiencing 
non-employment situations like first job seekers, unemployed or retirees. These mem-
bers have access to union services paying reduced dues.
Recent internal and external changes may explain the rise of materialistic incentives 
in the decision to join the union. The upturn in incentives to become a member connected 
to less stable job situations and non-traditional work environments has fueled a pluraliza-
tion of union members and their membership trajectories (Alós et al., 2011).6
Membership trajectories, membership duration, and 
the analysis of duration data
Membership dynamics can be understood as the interdependence of membership trajec-
tories (i.e., the process starting at the time of joining and finishing when leaving the 
union). A comprehensive analysis of membership trajectories should at least cover and 
connect the recruitment process with the initiatives that ease or impede membership 
 at Universidad de Valencia on July 2, 2015eid.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Vidal et al. 511
retention. Such an analysis should also cover the causes that lead to union exit, or the 
reasons members commit to the union for varying periods of time (Alós et al., 2011). 
However, due to data limitations, little research on the interconnected stages of member-
ship in relation to membership dynamics has been carried out (Schnabel, 2003).
The temporal continuity between these stages leads us to consider the length of mem-
bership (i.e., between joining and leaving) as an object of analysis in order to introduce 
initial evidence on what membership trajectories look like and whether we find system-
atic differences across union members. Some empirical literature has begun to analyze 
membership duration. Vaona (2008) presents an analysis of union duration for 29,035 
members of the Italian union CGIL, belonging to two counties of the Veneto region. 
Using OLS regression, where the dependent variable is membership tenure, Vaona finds 
that younger, female, foreign, and flexible workers are more likely to be recent members. 
Their shorter membership tenure, the author suggests, can be accounted for, on average, 
by inferior working conditions and vulnerable labor situations. Van Rij and Saris (1993) 
present an event-history analysis (or survival analysis) of duration until joining the 
union, and as well as duration from joining to exit. Using data from the Netherlands, they 
find that most exits occur with shorter rather than longer membership durations. The risk 
of leaving diminishes progressively the longer the individual membership is. Buttigieg 
et al. (2007) conduct a similar analysis of the Australian context. They find that shorter 
membership durations are related to non-unionized environments (i.e., no presence of a 
union at the firm level), individualistic orientations (i.e., usefulness of the union on 
achieving gains for the individual), and also when the individual perceives that the pro-
cedures designed to determine labor outcomes are ineffectual.
Characteristics of membership exits for the case of CCOO (Alós et al., 2011; Jódar 
et al., 2011b), as well as for other institutional settings (Gallie, 1996; Visser, 2002; 
Waddington, 2006; Waddington and Kerr, 1999), are similar to those of shorter member-
ship durations in the aforementioned studies. Women, younger and older age groups, 
foreigners, fixed-term contract situations, shorter service lengths, and workers in small 
firms or without union representatives are highly associated with leaving the union (Alós 
et al., 2011).7 In general, contextual changes pertaining to job situations produce the 
majority of union withdrawals independently of the initial commitment of members to 
the union (Klandermans, 1986; Visser, 2002). This is also the case for around half of 
leavers in CCOO (Alós et al., 2011). Although some would be tempted to sustain that 
stable careers lead to commitment to the union over time, evidence remains weak for 
such an assertion. Our aim is more reserved, as data do not allow accurate determination 
of the employment situation or repeated memberships over time. Instead, we offer a 
robust test on associations between the information provided at the time of membership 
registration for which we were able to derive variables and membership duration. The 
underlying hypothesis is that: women, youth (and workers of older age), non-Spanish 
nationals (as highly representative demographic groups of peripheral positions), those 
working in sectors of economic activity and regions with higher incidence of insecure 
employment and lower union tradition, and workers in firms with few or no union mem-
bers will leave the union within shorter periods of membership than the average.
To test for pluralization of membership trajectories and to observe nuances of seg-
mentation theory, we assume a further alternative: the membership typology of Alós 
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et al. (2009). This typology features four status-consistent groups reflecting the multidi-
mensional aspects behind diverse groups of members and delineates the segmented 
Spanish labor market.8 The largest group, the traditional-core, is comprised mainly of 
men, employed in private industry, in medium- to large-sized workplaces, with high 
seniority. A second group of members, the emerging-core, is comprised of workers with 
high educational attainment, working as technical staff in public services or private 
skilled service companies. Both groups, to be found in the unionized context, boast the 
largest rates of union activism (Jódar et al., 2011c); therefore, longer memberships are 
expected. A third group, the peripheral-in-transition, is composed of young male work-
ers with low seniority. Finally, there is a small group of peripheral members, mostly 
women with elementary or no education, and with no expectations of promotion. They 
are characterized by lower activism and by working in hostile environments for union 
members (Jódar et al., 2011c); we therefore expect shorter memberships.
In this research we also employ survival analysis methodology because of its ana-
lytical superiority over traditional regression methods for the object of analysis pro-
posed here.9 Survival analysis is the set of statistical techniques adequate to examine 
and model duration data (also time-to-event or spell data). This is the time span stretch-
ing from the beginning of a status until its end (e.g., the length of a membership spell). 
Technically, this measures the time that it takes until event occurrence or a transition 
between statuses from when the individual starts to be exposed to the risk of event 
occurrence or changing status.10 For instance, the risk of leaving the union starts at the 
very moment the individual becomes a union member, and not before. There are two 
main results of interest: the survival probability (i.e., the proportion of individuals who 
did not experience the event after an interval of time from the onset of the risk expo-
sure event), and the hazard rate or transition rate (i.e., the probability of experiencing 
an event at a given time interval, conditional on not having experienced the event 
before; e.g., since joining the union).
We mention three key features and advantages of the method. First, while traditional 
analysis of membership turnover averages out when union withdrawal happens, survival 
methods offer a wide range from parametric to non-parametric techniques to examine the 
shape of time functions for survival probabilities and hazard rates. These techniques 
account for the fact that durations are always positive and their distributions are skewed 
(e.g., members become more committed over time).
Second, survival analysis accounts for durations of those who left the union as well as 
those who are still members. The latter are called censored cases and are analytically 
important as their inclusion eliminates endemic bias in non-survival analysis designs. 
Although we do not observe when censored cases leave the union, accounting for the 
length of their membership by the end of the observation period corrects the results for 
selective features that lead to late leaving across union members.
Third, survival analysis allows identification of individual-, labor-, and union-related 
characteristics associated with short-term memberships and those which lead to long-
term commitments. In addition, by inclusion of characteristics that vary over time (e.g., 
employment status) it is possible to offer evidence on the interdependence of member-
ship duration with changing conditions (e.g., family situations, employment conditions 
or the relation with the union).
 at Universidad de Valencia on July 2, 2015eid.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Vidal et al. 513
Data
For our analyses, we use data from two registries on CCOO membership accessed at the 
union federation’s Revenue Administration Unit. Territorial units provide data to the 
central unit. The first of the registries covers information for all members who left the 
union between January and October 2009. This amounts to 160,367 observations. Exits 
in the registry are measured as those individuals who contacted the union and informed 
them about the wish to leave it, and those individuals who did not pay union dues for six 
consecutive months. To complement the leavers’ population, we use the registry of mem-
bers as of 31 October 2009. This amounts to 1,092,284 observations.
Due to the data limitations, we are compelled to apply some restrictions to our 
sample and restrict the interpretation of our results. First of all, our results cannot be 
separated from the period effect behind the determinants of leaving throughout the 
year 2009.11 This was a year where membership was particularly affected by layoffs 
and a reduction of new employment in the labor market coinciding with the second 
year of a world financial crisis. Second, our observation window, the period when 
exits are observed, is rather short if the analysis is strictly focused on those who 
joined and left within this period (i.e., membership under one year). Allowing for the 
introduction of observations for whom we observe the leaving date within the obser-
vation window, but who joined before the start of that period, can lead to left-trun-
cation bias. That is to say, while we allow individuals that joined the union prior to 
January 2009 to enter the analysis, we omit those who joined at a comparable date 
but left the union before January 2009. Thus, shorter durations of membership are 
underrepresented in the analyses. Larger bias increases the risk of leaving concentra-
tions in shorter durations. Being informed about this shortcoming, we decided to 
include in our analyses those individuals who joined the union after four years before 
the observation window (i.e., January 2005).12 We regard this as a sufficient time 
period to avoid large biases in our analyses.13 To shed more light on possible bias due 
to left-truncation, we run two parallel analyses; one for members who joined from 
January 2005 onwards, and another only for those observations representing mem-
bers who joined from January 2009 onwards (i.e., no left-truncation). The differ-
ences between the results for both samples are good indications for the direction of 
the biases.
We disregarded from the analyses those members not living in Spain, those who live 
in the North African Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla (below 1% of the initial 
population), and those over age 70 (2% of the initial population). With the application of 
these restrictions, our population for analysis is reduced to a sample of 547,168 individu-
als who joined between January 2005 and October 2009. By the 31 October 2009, 97,841 
individuals had left the union and 449,327 decided to remain.14
Data analysis
From the membership register we derive the following variables that feature the outcome 
of interest for survival analysis:
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Membership duration: Time in months since observation of last membership joining. 
Only for those who joined after 1 January 2005 and are still members, at least, until 
January 2009.
Censoring indicator: Dummy indicator that takes the value 1 when union leaving is 
observed between January and October 2009, and the value 0 when no leaving is observed 
(i.e., s/he is still a member by the end of the observation window).
We also use other information available in the membership registry to construct 
covariates, which the literature finds relevant to predict union exits (see e.g., Alós et al., 
2011). For the sake of reliability, we will only use information that was taken at the time 
of registration (i.e., the last time a member joined the union). Among others we use infor-
mation on:
Sex: Dummy indicator that takes value 1 for females (reference: 0 – males).
Age: Four dummy variables for age ranges: 16–29, 30–44, 45–59, 60–70.
Citizenship: Four dummy variables indicating the following citizenship groups: 
Spanish, African (mainly North African), Latin American, and other citizenships.
Activity branch: Twelve dummy variables encompassing sectors of economic activity 
with common collective bargaining outcomes.
Regional unit: We use 17 dummy variables identifying the union regional units.
Union members at the firm: Up to five dummy variables indicating the number of 
union members at the firm level (1–5, 6–25, 26–100, 101–500, > 500) and another vari-
able indicating ‘no members’ for non-employment situations (mainly unemployed and 
retired members), but also missing observations.
Membership channel: We grouped several channels in two main types: 1 – worker 
self-register (including passing by union office, telephone, mail, and internet) and 2 – via 
union contacts (including union representative in the company, visit of union representa-
tive from union office, and other forms of campaign).
We use two well-known techniques within the survival analysis family. First, non-
parametric techniques for the estimation of survival probabilities known as Kaplan–
Meier (KM) estimators (Kaplan and Meier, 1958) will be calculated and plotted as 
survival curves for each covariate category. KM estimates offer a simple and efficient 
estimation of the survival function, or the probability that leaving the union has not 
occurred at a given duration interval since the beginning of the possibility to experience 
the event. This will provide insight on the duration until exit for different membership 
groups.
Second, we apply Cox regression (Cox, 1972), a semi-parametric regression model 
for survival data, which estimates in a multivariate setting how membership groups 
raise or reduce the risk of membership withdrawal over time.15 The membership dura-
tion is cancelled out in the mathematics of the model and not a relevant result. The 
influences of the covariates introduced into the model on the hazard of leaving the 
union are therefore constant over time. This is known as the proportional hazards 
assumption (Blossfeld et al., 2007), and may not apply if, for example, we suspect 
that a certain covariate increases the hazard of leaving the union at the beginning of 
membership duration and decreases by the end. However, we test that assumption 
confirming proportionality of the effect over duration intervals for the great majority 
of covariates.16
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Results
Survival curves
We first present the description of the average membership duration by personal-, labor-, 
and union-related characteristics. We present survival probabilities estimated by the 
Kaplan–Meier method, which can be interpreted as the proportion of members remain-
ing in the union in a given membership duration interval (e.g., the proportion of those 
still members after six months of joining). On average, we find that after 12 months more 
than 10% of the membership left the union. The result suggests that there is a high turno-
ver among recent joiners, most probably due to the change in the job situation or after the 
use of union services (Jódar et al., 2011b). The rest of the descriptive results are pre-
sented graphically as survival curves (i.e., survival probabilities in the y-axis over all 
observed duration intervals on the x-axis) by different categories. The Wilcoxon test is 
used to assess the significant differences between survival functions.
In Figure 1, we show survival curves of membership duration by sex, age, and citizen-
ship. First, patterns of leaving for men and women over duration intervals are not notice-
ably different; though men have durations of membership which are marginally shorter 
than those of women, and the difference is statistically significant. The result confirms 
what others have found: the effect of the economic crisis on women’s joining and leaving 
rates has been delayed (Jódar et al., 2012).
Second, there is a clear difference in the levels and speed of leaving between the 
youngest age group (i.e., 16- to 29-year-olds), clearly the most vulnerable, and other age 
groups: 20% of the youngest age group left the union before the second year of member-
ship, and about 40% had left the union by the fourth year of membership. These levels 
are much lower among other age groups. In order, the second (30–44) and third (45–59) 
age groups present moderate levels of disaffection, with relatively less incidence at 
shorter durations than the youngest age group. The oldest age group (60 and more) dis-
plays low intensities of leaving at shorter durations of membership, but very high intensi-
ties at longer ones. Leaving after retirement, at age 65, might be the reason behind the 
pattern observed for this group.
Differences by citizenship are also discernible. We confirm the results of Jódar et al. 
(2011b) in Catalonia, where non-nationals are more likely to leave the union. In particu-
lar, more than 75% of the non-Spanish citizens who joined between 2005 and 2009 left 
the union in 2009, while this percentage is reduced to 25% for the case of Spanish citi-
zens.17 The magnitude of this result substantiates evidence which indicates that the eco-
nomic crisis has substantially affected the employment situation of non-Spanish 
citizens.
Figure 2 presents survival curves for activity branches. There are activity branches 
that clearly suffer more membership losses, and particularly faster, than the others (i.e., 
at shorter durations people are more likely to leave). They are the construction branch 
and the retail and other personal services branches, respectively. These activity sectors, 
boasting high rates of seasonal employment, were decidedly exposed to economic diffi-
culties deriving from the economic crisis of the period of study (see Toharia, 2011).
Figure 3 presents survival curves by regional units. Differences are not very impor-
tant, but we find an initial high attrition among the Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, 
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Valencian Community, Murcia, and – to a lesser extent – Andalusia and Castile-La 
Mancha. Most of these regions share a high percentage of their workforce devoted to 
personal services, high levels of seasonality, and work insecurity, and less union 
tradition.
The most striking differences are presented in Figure 4 and relate to the level and rate 
of leaving regarding the channel used for joining the union. We employ the term union 
contact register when a union contact (e.g., union representative at the firm) was directly 
involved in the registration of a member, and a self-register in lieu of this situation. Those 
who join by self-register have relatively larger levels of attrition during the first five years 
than those joining by union contacts. In particular, half of the members who joined by 
self-register are likely to leave the union before the fifth year of membership. Although 
self-registered workers may also have contacts in the union, this membership channel 
reflects non- or less unionized environments and higher membership vulnerability.
In Figure 4, we also present survival curves according to the size of membership at the 
firm level. For those cases coded in the registries as 0 union members in the firm, we 
cannot distinguish those who are not employed from those who did not provide informa-
tion on membership size. First, those in missing information/non-employment situations 
(i.e., unemployed, retired and other pensioners) present shorter membership durations 
than those in employment. In particular, half of those registered with no information 
about membership size are likely to leave the union before the fourth year of member-
ship. This suggests that most of them are to be found in non-employment situations or 
Figure 2. Survival curves by activity branch.
Wilcoxon tests: Pr>chi2 = .00.
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very small firms. Among the employed, the number of union members at the firm pre-
sents minor differences on the duration of membership when compared to not being 
employed or not having information on the membership size.18 The more union members 
a firm has, the longer the average duration and the lower the attrition rate is after five 
years of membership. This result confirms that workers in a unionized context have 
lower probabilities of leaving.
Cox regression
In the subsequent paragraphs we present the results of the Cox regression to highlight the 
effects of the covariates described above on leveling the risk of union leaving, control-
ling for all variables in the same model. The variable membership channel will be 
excluded from regression analysis due to the high degree of missing information in the 
registry.19 We also exclude those over age 60, as this category violates the proportional 
hazards assumption of Cox regression models commented earlier. This omission forces 
us to exclude the union branch for pensioners. No variable indicating period of joining/
leaving (i.e., calendar year) is included, as the observation window of leave takes place 
only in 2009; therefore, a period variable would be collinear with the duration of mem-
bership. The coefficients of the covariates in the analysis are presented as hazard rates 
(i.e., exponentiated coefficients) and represent higher hazard of union leaving than the 
Figure 3. Survival curves by regional unit.
Wilcoxon tests: Pr>chi2 = .00.
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average (when the hazard rate is above 1), or lower hazard (when the hazard rate is below 
1). The positive or negative effect of the covariates is presumed to be constant over all 
membership duration intervals.
In the second column of Table 1 (i.e., Joining since Jan. 2005), we present the results 
for a model where members joined after January 2005 and were leaving between January 
and October 2009, or stayed in the union after October 2009. Regarding sociodemo-
graphic variables, the results of the regression analysis validate, ceteris paribus, those of 
KM estimation. Those with citizenship other than Spanish have twice the hazard rates of 
leaving the union at each duration interval. Young people (under 30) have an exponenti-
ated coefficient of 1.74, which means that members under age 30 are 1.74 times more 
likely to leave the union at any duration interval than members in the age group 45–59. 
Likewise, the age group 30–44 is 1.23 times more likely to leave than those aged 45–59. 
Ceteris paribus, women are only marginally more likely to leave at each duration inter-
val than men. This confirms that sociodemographic characteristics associated to periph-
eral employment situations in the labor market are more likely to leave the union at any 
given time.
Regarding the activity branch, only those dealing with welfare services (e.g., education 
and health), or those of financial services, have a lower risk of union exit for all time 
intervals when compared to the largest one (i.e., public administration). Members in other 
branches present higher risks of leaving than the reference category, with construction and 
Figure 4. Survival curves by membership channel and by membership size at firm.
Wilcoxon tests: membership channel (Pr>chi2 = .00), membership size at firm (Pr>chi2 = .00).
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Table 1. Cox regression of duration of membership (hazard rates).
Joining since Jan. 2005 Joining since Jan. 2009
 Hazard ratio Hazard ratio
(a) Sex: female (ref. male) 1.05*** (0.01) 0.97 (0.02)
(b) Citizenship (ref. Spanish)
 North African 2.43*** (0.03) 2.09*** (0.07)
 Latin American 2.58*** (0.04) 2.19*** (0.08)
 Others 2.27*** (0.04) 1.95*** (0.09)
(c) Age (ref. 45–59)
 16–29 1.74*** (0.02) 1.44*** (0.04)
 30–44 1.23*** (0.01) 1.21*** (0.03)
(d) Activity branch (ref. public administration)
 Services (miscellaneous) 1.39*** (0.02) 1.41*** (0.06)
 Agriculture 1.17*** (0.02) 1.16*** (0.05)
 Financial services 0.88*** (0.02) 0.84*** (0.04)
 Construction 1.54*** (0.02) 1.28*** (0.05)
 Education 0.64*** (0.01) 0.67*** (0.04)
 Retail 1.40*** (0.02) 1.50*** (0.06)
 Industry 1.16*** (0.02) 1.00 (0.04)
 Textile 1.01 (0.02) 0.92 (0.06)
 Health 0.80*** (0.01) 0.63*** (0.04)
(e) Regional unit (ref. Andalusia)
 Aragon 0.83*** (0.02) 0.77*** (0.04)
 Asturias 0.69*** (0.02) 0.66*** (0.05)
 Cantabria 0.80*** (0.02) 0.67*** (0.06)
 Castile-Leon 0.66*** (0.01) 0.66*** (0.04)
 Castile-La Mancha 0.86*** (0.01) 0.69*** (0.03)
 Catalonia 0.73*** (0.01) 0.56*** (0.03)
 Basque Country 0.76*** (0.02) 0.72*** (0.04)
 Extremadura 0.84*** (0.02) 0.77*** (0.06)
 Galicia 0.82*** (0.02) 0.67*** (0.04)
 Balearic Islands 1.32*** (0.03) 0.92 (0.07)
 Canary Islands 1.27*** (0.02) 1.09* (0.05)
 Madrid 0.79*** (0.01) 0.69*** (0.03)
 Murcia 0.95*** (0.02) 1.03 (0.05)
 Valencian Community 1.05*** (0.01) 0.86*** (0.03)
 La Rioja 0.76*** (0.03) 0.71*** (0.09)
 Navarre 0.65*** (0.02) 0.74*** (0.06)
(f) Membership size at firm (ref. > 500)
 Non-employed/no info. 3.27*** (0.04) 3.83*** (0.15)
 1–5 members 1.20*** (0.02) 1.13*** (0.05)
 6–25 members 1.39*** (0.02) 1.28*** (0.06)
 26–100 members 1.20*** (0.02) 1.09 (0.06)
 101–500 members 1.12*** (0.02) 1.15*** (0.06)
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retail and personal services branches exhibiting particularly high leaving hazards. We 
took Andalusia, the largest unit with a higher level of members working in personal ser-
vices, as a reference category for the regional unit. As for the activity-specificity of the 
reference category, we find that most of the coefficients for the other regions show lower 
hazards of leaving. This holds more for regions with industrial traditions (e.g., Basque 
Country or Catalonia), as well as for those where tourism-related services are not at the 
core of their economic activity (e.g., Asturias, Castile-Leon or Madrid). Instead, regions 
which rely chiefly on seasonal work derived from personal services or a diminished union 
tradition (such as the Balearic Islands, Canary Islands or Valencian Community) show 
more intense rates of leaving at any given time. Regarding the size of membership at the 
firm level, we find that those working in firms with more than 500 union members have 
the lowest propensities of withdrawal. Other sizes of membership have similar hazard 
ratios of leaving the union though. Last, non-employment situations, and those with no 
information on membership size, are associated with the highest risks of leaving the union 
at any duration interval.
To confirm the validity or the bias of our results due to left-truncation, we run a paral-
lel analysis with observations that are strictly not left-truncated. We do so in the model 
presented in the third column of Table 1 (i.e., Joining since Jan. 2009), where members 
joined since January 2009 and were leaving between January and October 2009. The 
results of this model greatly resemble those of the model with left-truncation, with some 
exceptions. First, women are no more likely to leave at any time than men. Previous 
research has found that women have been consolidating their membership over time, and 
that the economic crisis has affected more the membership of men, more often working 
in the construction sector (Jódar et al., 2012). The other sociodemographic characteris-
tics (age and citizenship) reduce the differences with the reference categories, though the 
sign and the statistical significance of the coefficients remain stable. Slight changes are 
also observed for other coefficients, but do not affect the interpretations presented so far. 
All in all, the problem of left-truncation in our initial analysis does not significantly bias 
our results.
Finally, we present predictions of the hazard rates and the survival curves adjusting 
for characteristics of the four groups which Alós et al. (2009) worked out, mirroring traits 
of segmentation of the Spanish labor market also in the union membership. The dataset, 
unfortunately, does not allow us to construct the groups as in Alós et al. (2009). However, 
we present proxies with the available data. The two peripheral groups are identified, first 
Joining since Jan. 2005 Joining since Jan. 2009
 Hazard ratio Hazard ratio
N 488,881 97,607
Log-likelihood (empty model) –1,091,449.9 –107,810.3
Log-likelihood (final model) –1,058,791.6 –103,717.8
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Exits are observed between January and October 2009.
Table 1. (Continued)
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by women, above age 30, working in the retail sector, as the peripheral group; and by 
those aged below 30, as the peripherals-in-transition. Regarding the central groups, one 
captures men between the ages 45 and 59, working in industry, as the traditional-core, 
and another accounts for workers aged 30–44 working in financial services or the public 
sector, as the emerging-core.
The predicted hazard rates (left) and survival curves (right) presented in Figure 5 are 
baseline hazard rates and survival probabilities adjusted for the membership categories 
commented above and using the results of the above Cox estimations.20 Predictions by 
groups produce results which confirm previous research.21 The predicted hazard rates 
show, in general, increasing risks of leaving the union from joining until the 10th month 
of membership duration, which is the highest peak of leaving hazard. Following this, leav-
ing hazards reduce over time, indicating that the longer the membership duration the more 
committed the membership. Differences, however, are noticeable across groups. We find 
that the peripheral groups are those with a higher hazard of leaving at any time, especially 
at shorter membership durations. The consequence is that peripheral groups leave more by 
the end of the observation period and present shorter average duration memberships com-
pared with the central groups. In particular, the youth group (peripherals-in-transition) 
presents the highest hazard of leaving, with 10% having left in the first 12 months and 
approximately 25% having exited the union after five years. The traditional-core group 
has the lowest rate of disaffection (5% at the end of the observation window) and the 
Figure 5. Cox regression predicted hazard rates (left) and survival curves (right).
Predictions based on regression model Joining since Jan. 2005 of Table 1.
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highest predicted survival probabilities for all prior duration intervals. The other two 
groups lie in between, with middle-aged women in retail (peripherals) more likely to 
leave and with lower membership durations than the emerging-core.
Discussion and conclusions
In this article we have proposed a further step in understanding membership dynamics by 
analyzing membership durations in the largest general union federation in Spain – 
Comisiones Obreras (CCOO). The results of the survival analysis show high and increas-
ing union leaving intensities at short membership durations, leveling off after the first 
year of membership. Moreover, there is a dualization (or pluralization) of membership 
trajectories as different characteristics in the analysis are not uniformly distributed across 
membership durations. Confirming our expectations, workers’ personal characteristics 
associated with insecure jobs and those working in non-unionized contexts are more 
likely to stay for a shorter time in the union and are more likely to leave at any given 
time. This is particularly the case of youth, foreigners, and workers in volatile sectors 
such as retail, construction, and those in small firms. In contrast, workers in sectors with 
a tradition of unionism, like industrial sectors, or where the influence of the union 
emerged more recently (mainly the public service sectors), and those in regional units 
where the union is particularly strong have memberships which appear to be longer and 
the probability of leaving is much lower. The pluralization of memberships is addition-
ally confirmed by testing the typology of CCOO union members by Alós et al. (2009), 
where the extreme vulnerability of the membership of the youth (peripherals-in-transi-
tion) contrasts with the more stable memberships of traditional industrial workers 
(traditional-core).
The facts presented so far suggest that high membership turnover in CCOO is partly 
derived from express-memberships of short durations. These are mainly featured by the 
growing segment of peripheral workers in the membership, though they are still a minor-
ity. This may illustrate the case of workers who join for the express intention of solving 
an immediate problem. However, due to the vulnerability of the work situation and the 
invisibility of the union in the work environment, these workers might disaffect them-
selves from union membership. This can happen in a very short time if the employment 
situation does not improve or the union is not perceived to be close and active. To pro-
vide an illustration, workers under age 30 have the highest rates of unemployment and 
fixed-term contracts in Spain. This age group represents around 8% of the membership 
of CCOO in 2010, but they were around 70% of all new CCOO members in 2010 but 
60% of exits during the same period.
The results of this research indicate that the union has paid more attention to the 
attraction than to the retention of new membership. Current efforts to retain potential 
leavers range from reducing union dues for the non-employed and offering individual-
ized counseling, to contacting those with pending dues in order to retain them. However, 
results also indicate the need to focus on those workers with more precarious job situa-
tions, or non-unionized work environments, and to do so at an early stage of member-
ships. That is, the union should identify specific demands of the new membership as 
soon as possible following joining, in order to avoid ex-members stating that they left the 
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union because they felt the union never did anything for them (Jódar et al., 2011c). The 
union should make an initial contact with its members before a pending due appears or 
before the self-arrangement of individual counseling appointments by members. Early 
contacts are even more important in small work centers with no union representatives, 
where peripheral worker members are employed, boasting low levels of activism (Jódar 
et al., 2011b) and high levels of union attrition (Jódar et al., 2011c). The implantation of 
transversal union delegates to deal with matters of work centers without union repre-
sentatives, but with union members, can make the union visible and more accessible to 
their members.
The union should also pay attention to the diversity among potential leavers. We do 
not claim (and results do not allow raising any causal claim) that only one mechanism 
leads to leaving and its timing across peripheral workers. Instead, multiple situations and 
demands might exist. For instance, women are a very heterogeneous group. Some have 
relatively higher education and work in public or financial services. These women are 
more likely to have lower costs of remaining in the union than other women, generally 
much younger or older, who work in less qualified services and have poor career pros-
pects. Youth, striving for labor market insertion, are likely to change to a job that 
improves their employment conditions substantively instead of engaging in collective 
action (Antón, 2007; Germe, 2011). Immigrants as a group are more likely to lose 
employment by working in more volatile sectors (e.g., construction). However, immi-
grants are also more likely to enter the union if they were unionized in their country of 
origin and if they find a critical mass of co-ethnics (Jódar et al., 2011a). Indeed, sociali-
zation and contacts in the union (i.e., relatives, acquaintances, or work colleagues) may 
explain differences between peripheral workers who enter and remain the union and 
those who do not.
It is important to identify under what conditions (including social contacts) a large 
proportion of new membership remains over a year, and maybe over the length of 
their work contract.22 In an inclusive model of industrial relations like Spain, where 
workers do not need to join the union to enjoy bargaining outcomes, the employment 
situation is still an important, but not the only, catalyst of membership dynamics. We 
should draw attention to the efforts of the union on recruitment practices of new mem-
bership groups. The turn towards a social partnership model and a servicing organiza-
tion has been responsible for the increase and consolidation of new membership 
groups, emphasizing the plurality of membership composition. This, however, is dif-
ficult to fit into a common union strategy. Secretariats and localized structures for 
youth, foreigners or women have been active in dealing with specific problems of 
these workers in order to ensure their recruitment and retention. However, the effects 
of these efforts may have been limited so far. It should be kept in mind that the overall 
capacity of union membership recruitment and retention in Spain can be limited in 
comparison to unions in other industrialized nations by a lack of clearly articulated 
bargaining structure, featuring a rather weak shop-floor, and the endemic under-
organized civil society that undermines the establishment of long-term strategic coali-
tions (Hamman and Martinez Lucio, 2003). These tensions are also evidenced by 
some results of re-joining levels for CCOO in Catalonia, where only 10% of leavers 
between 2001 and 2010 were likely to re-join, indicating that those who leave the 
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union are unlikely to return. Although unrepresentative, these results point to the need 
for further examination of who re-joins and when.
In this article we have gone beyond the leave/stay dichotomy, and shown differences 
on durations of membership. Longer durations support organizational stability and con-
solidate union representation strategies, while short durations assimilate to uncertainties. 
The findings of this type of analysis shed some light on understanding membership 
dynamics and may be useful to invoke priorities of retention at specific moments of high 
incidence of attrition. Survival models are appealing methods for the analysis of mem-
bership duration as they account for endemic biases in the analyses of duration data with 
traditional methods (e.g., censored cases and non-normality of duration function). They 
also allow the assessment of independent variables that may change over time (e.g., job 
situation).
We are aware that our analyses suffer some flaws and interpretation might be 
delimited. Although our results are more reliable than those of traditional regression 
methods, analyses should be replicated for a longer period of observation. One should 
also be aware that we analyzed a period of economic crisis. This may particularly 
emphasize shorter duration for those more prone to leaving the union, those whom the 
economic crisis has affected the most (e.g., youth, foreigners). In the analysis, women 
presented longer membership durations than men because the effects of the economic 
crisis on lowering their joining and leaving rates have been delayed. Future analyses 
should also include a richer set of personal-related characteristics, such as values, 
perceptions, educational attainment, as well as (changing) job- or work context-spe-
cific characteristics relevant to test different theoretical arguments about membership 
trajectories and/or their pluralization. In addition, if an individual is likely to join and 
leave the union several times, then the whole working biography of an individual 
might form the object of analysis. For that we must extend the traditional setting of 
single memberships to multilevel methods that allow modeling repeated memberships 
of the same individual.
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Notes
 1. In some countries the equally high rates of joining and leaving implied the maintenance, or 
even slight increases, of membership levels over time. This is also the case of Spain where 
union density remained stable at around 17–20% of the labour force since the mid-1990s 
(Beneyto, 2011).
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 2. Traditionally the union receives more financial resources from the state due to their repre-
sentativeness measured by the outcomes from worker representatives’ elections, than from 
membership dues.
 3. This fact suggests that the relative strength of unions is measured more by elected representa-
tives in work councils than by the membership size.
 4. Both unions engage, usually in unison, in almost all collective bargaining in Spain.
 5. It is worth noting that a dualization of employment conditions, separating secure from inse-
cure positions, has been found to be very strong in the Spanish case (Banyuls et al., 2009), 
which boasts one of the largest rates of fixed-term employment contracts within western 
economies. Although the proportion of non-permanent contract workers has increases in 
terms of union membership, their levels of membership still do not mirror their levels in the 
labor market (Alós et al., 2011).
 6. Swapping between the two main union federations (CCOO and UGT) is considered normal 
practice depending on which one is present in the firm or, when both are present, depending 
on which offers more attractive services.
 7. Males of adult age, manufacturing work, large companies, and workers in unionized working 
environments are less likely to leave the union and more likely to report a high level of com-
promise with the union and to take positions of responsibility, like union delegates. These 
workers also feature among the much smaller fraction of those leaving the union for reasons 
of disagreement with the union organization, priorities on union strategies, union ideology, or 
alternatively through lay-off or early retirement (Alós et al., 2011).
 8. Membership groups were generated by means of multivariate methods of information reduc-
tion. First, multiple correspondence analysis was applied to reduce personal, work, and firm-
related information of a random sample of union members into a few consistent dimensions. 
These dimensions were used in a cluster analysis to calculate distances across sample cases 
that were ultimately used to classify individuals into groups, which were internally homoge-
neous and as different as possible from each other (see Alós et al., 2009).
 9. In the empirical literature different names are used to refer to the same methodology, e.g., 
event-history analysis, duration analysis or transition-rate analysis.
10. Risk and risk set are traditional terminology in survival analysis that merely refer respectively 
to non-zero probability and population with non-zero probability of event-occurrence. The 
name derives from initial analyses done to measure death timings in epidemiological 
literature.
11. Employment seasonality is not relevant in our analysis as we account for union exits during 
almost the whole year of 2009.
12. Those who joined before January 2005 accounted for 54% of the initial population.
13. Cain et al. (2011) suggest that the lower the proportion of left-truncated cases the less the bias 
we introduce into the results.
14. Those who left the union before January 2009 were not observed.
15. Cox models are sensible to ties, that is to say that many cases share the same event time. We 
apply the Breslow method to eliminate this issue from our analyses (see Breslow, 1974).
16. Only the older age group (60–70) presents a non-proportional pattern, as we discuss later.
17. Jódar et al. (2011) find that the stabilization of the employment situation (e.g., permanent 
work contract) for immigrant workers is associated with lengthier memberships and with the 
acquisition of Spanish citizenship. Therefore, identifying immigrant populations by citizen-
ship instead of country of birth yields biased portrayals of worse-off outcomes across 
migrants.
18. We found a significant association between the category of non-employment/no information 
on membership size and the worker self-register as a membership channel. This is because 
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those who self-register do not always report the firm identification number, by which the 
firm’s membership size is obtained.
19. Missing information on this variable is particularly important in some regions (e.g., 95% of 
responses are missing in Catalonia), as the collection of data is done by each regional unit.
20. Unlike the crude survival curves calculated by the KM method, the predicted (or adjusted) 
survival curves for each group keep constant at the mean value of other coefficients in the 
model, so the results are interpreted as survival probabilities net of other confounding varia-
bles in the model.
21. We estimated a model regarding interaction terms of the variables presented in Table 1 in 
order to assess statistically significant differences across membership profiles. The interac-
tion terms, not presented here for space reasons, are statistically significant and confirm the 
differences on duration of membership and leaving rates across membership groups.
22. Unpublished analysis of a survey of CCOO union leavers indicate that 34% of union leavers 
had disrupted their employment situation and/or changed job/occupation during their 
membership.
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